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Criminal Law: The Entrapment Doctrine as a Defense in Wisconsin: The case of State v. Rice' presents one of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's more recent comments concerning the doctrine of
entrapment. In that case, the defendant had been convicted of both
possession and use of narcotics. Among the ten issues raised on appeal
was a challenge to the trial court's instruction to the jury that the defense of entrapment was not available to the defendant. The supreme
court said that since there was no testimony indicating that the police
informer who accompanied the defendant had in any way prompted or
arranged a trip to Chicago to buy the narcotics the defendant was
arrested with, the trial court's instruction was correct. The court then
restated the definition of entrapment which had been set forth in State
v. Hochman,2 the most expansive the court has ever rendered on the
doctrine:
Entrapment is the inducement of one to commit a crime not
contemplated by him for the mere purpose of instituting criminal
prosecution against him....
There is a very clear distinction between inducing a person
to do an unlawful act and setting a trap to catch him in the execution of a criminal design of his own conception ....3
Because the doctrine of entrapment is the subject of considerable
controversy as to the rationale of the defense and the nature of its
elements, 4 and because the defense is beginning to be claimed on constitutional bases,5 it is desirable to consider how the Wisconsin concept
compares with the federal concept and those of other states. It is also
137 Wis. 2d 392, 155 N.W.2d 116 (1967).
22

Wis. 2d 410, 86 N.W.2d 446 (1957). State v. Hochman is the clearest example
of a potential entrapment case that the Wisconsin court has considered. The
defendant was convicted for selling obscene material to a plain clothes officer. The officer had gone to the defendant's book shop and requested the
items, but the defendant informed him that he only sold the "hotter stuff"
to known customers and invited the officer to become a better customer. After
several visits, the defendant sold the officer obscene material and was arrested. On these facts, the Wisconsin court held that there was no entrapment because the officer merely set a trap to catch the defendant committing
a crime of his own design.
3 37 Wis. 2d at 400, 155 N.W.2d at 120-21.
4See the discussion of the majority and concurring opinions in both Sorrells
v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), and Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
369 (1958),-infra. See generally Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of
Encouragement, 49 VA. L. REv. 871, 890 (1963) ; Williams, The Defense of
Entrapment and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecutions, 28 FoRn L. REv.
399 (1959) ; Note, 1960 Wis. L. Rv. 536; Note, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1333 (1960).
5United States ex rel. Hall v. Illinois, 329 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1964), denied a
writ of habeas corpus, stating that the due process clause does not apply to
entrapment claims against state officers if the defendant is allowed to plead
and prove the defense as recognized in the courts of the state. In United
States ex rel. Toler v. Pate, 332 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1954), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit again faced the question and denied
the petition. Mercer, J., concurred because of the previous decision in the
Hall case, but said that an entrapment case may be "so offensive to the conscience of our society that it must be embraced within the fluid concept of
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appropriate to consider the development of the Wisconsin concept,
through statute and case law, to determine the strength of the foundation for the existing definition.
The Federaland State Doctrines of Entrapment
The defense of entrapment was clearly recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in Sorrells v. United States," and was reaffirmed
in Sherman v. United States.7 The majority in both cases held that the
two basic elements required to constitute the defense are (1) conduct
by the government agent which induces the defendant to commit the
crime, and (2) a lack of predisposition to commit the crime on the
part of the defendant." A minority in both cases recognized the doctrine
and agreed in the reversals, but felt that the test of entrapment should
be more objective. The proposal offered was to base the determination
on the nature of the inducements, without regard to the predisposition
of the particular defendant. Thus, the decision would be based on
whether the government agent's conduct would be "likely to induce
those not otherwise ready and willing to commit crime." 9 If it is objectionable police conduct that is to be deterred by the doctrine of entrapment, the minority view is considered to be more appropriate. It
sets a relatively fixed standard of conduct for officers and their agents,
and it will not allow clearly objectionable conduct to be upheld by virtue
of a finding that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.
The majority opinions in Sorrells and Sherman, however, are conthe due process requirement." 332 F2d at 427. See Note, 1964 U. ILL. L. F.
821; Note, 74 YALE L. J. 942 (1965).
A suggestion of future applications of due process to the entrapment
doctrine may be inferred from Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965), where
the Court, on due process grounds, reversed a conviction for picketing "near"
a courthouse after police officials informed appellant that picketing where he
did would not violate the statute. The Court said that to sustain the conviction would be "to sanction an indefensible sort of entrapment by the State
... . The Due Process Clause does not permit convictions to be obtained
under such circumstances." 379 U.S. at 571.
a 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
7356 U.S. 359 (1958).
s In Sorrells, a federal prohibition officer posed as a tourist and visited defendant's home. While discussing common World War I experiences, the
government agent repeatedly requested to purchase liquor from defendant,
but defendant initially refused. Finally defendant obtained a half-gallon and
sold it to the agent. There was no evidence that he had sold or possessed
liquor in the past. The Supreme Court held that there were facts which might
support a jury finding of entrapment and reversed and remanded the case
for failure to submit the issue to the jury.
In Sherman, a police informer was under a doctor's care for recovery
from narcotics addiction. Defendant was under the same doctor's care for
the same purpose. The agent repeatedly asked defendant for a source of
drugs, appealing to defendant's sympathy with reports of his suffering and
claims of nonresponse to treatment. After several refusals, defendant acquired
narcotics and shared them with the agent. Later sales were observed by federal
narcotics agents and defendant was arrested and convicted. The Court reversed, finding entrapment as a matter of law.
9 356 U.S. at 384.
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trolling, and therefore the ultimate test is one of "origin of intent."'10
If the intent should be found to have originated with the government
agent-such finding to be made through the presence of inducements
and the absence of predisposition-the defense of entrapment would be
successful. The precise legal basis of the defense is somewhat confused.
The majority view is that in passing criminal prohibitions, Congress
did not intend the statutes to apply to such situations,"' while the minority based its reasoning on public policy,' 2 but under either view the
defendant is acquitted upon a finding of entrapment.
Nearly all state courts accept the entrapment defense,' 3 and most
of them follow the majority view of the federal Court. 4 California
follows the Sorrells -Sherman majority test, but uses as its rationale
the supervisory power of the courts over standards of evidence and
procedure. It also prohibits the use of evidence of prior crimes to prove
predisposition. 15 California has recently overruled part of its case law
on entrapment and held that one can raise the defense of entrapment
without admitting the facts alleged. 16 The California view represents
nearly as great a divergence from the Sorrells-Sherman majority as
can be found among the states.
Illinois has a statutory defense of entrapment that parallels the
Sorrells-Shermanmajority definition.17' The Illinois court has also followed the dual test of Sorrells and Sherman without mentioning the
statute.' 8 Unlike the California court, however, the Illinois court has
held that the defense is not available if the defendant denies the allegations of facts constituting the offense. 1 The Illinois view exemplifies
a relatively strict adherence to the Sorrells-Sherman majority.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court agrees with the Sorrells-Sherman
majority and with the Illinois court. The definition of entrapment stated
in State v. Rice and quoted supra is very similar to the United States
10

Note, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (1960).

1 356 U.S. at 372.

"Id. at 380. Since the minority bases its holding on policy, it feels the question
of entrapment should be determined by the judge, whereas the majority submits it to the jury. Id. at 385.
13Comment, 9 Sw. L. J. 456, 465 n.44 (1955). New York and Tennessee are considered to be the only states not clearly recognizing the doctrine. People v.
Schacher, 47 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Magis. Ct. 1944) ; Roden v. State, 209 Tenn. 202,
352 S.W.2d 227 (1961) ; Note, 1964 U. ILL. L. F. 821, 822.
14 Rotenberg, supra note 4, at 890-91.
15 People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 345 P.2d 928 (1959).
16 People v. Perez, 62 Cal. 2d 769, 401 P.2d 934, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1965).
17 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 7-12 (1963): A person is not guilty of an offense if
his conduct is incited or induced by a public officer or employee, or agent of
either, for the purpose of obtaining evidence for the prosecution of such person. However, this section is inapplicable if a public officer or employee, or
agent of either, merely affords to such person the opportunity or facility for
committing an offense in furtherance of a criminal purpose which such person has originated.
18 People v. Hall, 25 II1. 2d 297, 185 N.E.2d 143 (1962).
19People v. Anthony, 28 Ill. 2d 65, 190 N.E.2d 837 (1963).
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Supreme Court's view, 20 and the dual test of inducement and lack of
predisposition is followed. 21 It is considered an affirmative defense in

the nature of confession and avoidance, and raised by a plea of not
guilty. Therefore, entrapment is not a proper basis for a motion to
suppress evidence under the Wisconsin view, but is merely a question
for the jury.22 The Wisconsin court considers the question of entrapment an unfit subject for preliminary or collateral determination because it is "not a ground for excluding evidence. Evidence illegally
obtained will be suppressed or excluded in a criminal case only upon
a showing that it was obtained in violation of constitutional right."2"
Clearly, the Wisconsin concept of entrapment is unreceptive to the
growing view that entrapment is a violation of due process, and that
the Sorrells-Shermanminority's more objective test should be used, but
it is consistent with the Sorrells-Sherman majority view and that of
the greater number of states.
The Development of the Doctrinein Wisconsin
Topolewski v. State24 is often cited as the first entrapment case decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In Topolewski, the defendant
conceived a plan to steal goods from a meat-packing company. Upon
hearing of the plan, the intended victim sent an employee to feign participation in the theft with the defendant. At the time of actual execution
of the plan, the company arranged for the goods to be available on a
loading platform and instructed its employees not to interfere with the
defendant's acquisition of the goods. In reversing the defendant's larceny
conviction, the court held that the company's conduct came very near
to solicitation, and with the fact that the company placed the goods on
the platform with instructions to let the defendant take them, there
were absent the essential elements of trespass and non-consent. The
court said that by performing or rendering unnecessary some act in
the transaction essential to the offense, the company made the defendant
not guilty of all the elements.
Thus, although the court spoke of the propriety of setting a trap
affording "the freest opportunity to commit the offense" 25 and commented on a "formal design" to commit crime, 2 Topolewski is not
actually an entrapment case. Entrapment requires encouragement on
the part of a government agent or one in his employ, and presumes per2o As the Court stated in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 434 (1963) : "The
conduct with which the defense of entrapment is concerned is the inanufacturing of crime by law enforcement officials and their agents."
21 State v. Hochman, 2 Wis. 2d 410, 414, 86 N.W.2d 446, 448 (1957).
22 Id. at 418, 86 N.W.2d at 451.
23 Id. at 419, 86 N.W.2d at 451.
24 130 Wis. 244, 109 N.W. 1037 (1906).
25 Id. at 253, 109 N.W. at 1040.
26 Id. at 256, 109 N.W. at 1041.
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formance of the acts essential to the crime. In Topolewski the intended
victim did the encouraging, and the defendant was able to disprove
the element of non-consent. Thus, Topolewski really presents a case
of the prosecution's failure of proof, not a case of the defendant's successful affirmative defense.

27

The second Wisconsin case considered to have presented an entrapment issue was Koscak v. State.28 Private detectives under the in-

tended victim's employ acted as accomplices to the defendant in his
alleged attempt to destroy his former employer's property. The court
reversed a conviction under a statute making it a crime to possess explosives with the intent to use destructively or with knowledge that
others so intended. The court said that the defendant could not be
guilty of the second part of the crime if the others in fact had no intent
to use the explosives. The reversal rested on ambiguous instructions
on this point, and also on the court's view that where agents of the
intended victim were active in prompting, urging and instigating the
perpetuation of the offense, and the accused was only a passive participant through their incitement and intimidation, 29 he was not bound
by their acts and was not guilty of the offense. The facts showed an
inference of such a passiveness, and it was held error not to instruct.
A dissenting opinion by Justice Barnes claimed that "consent" of the
intended victim never gave immunity. He went on to say:
Furthermore, the fact that the party against whom a crime is
contemplated suggests, aids, encourages, or abets the commission
of the offense or sets a trap for the accused is not a defense where
the accused has done every act essential to the completion of the
offense.2 0
Like Topolewski, Koscak is not an entrapment case. Here again the
"trap" was set by agents of a private citizen rather than a government
agent. The "passiveness" concept of the majority went to the failure
of proof of the essential elements of the crime. And furthermore, the
case was principally reversed on an error in instructing the jury. Justice
Barnes' dissent only disagreed with the majority on the point of whether
"'consent" of the intended victim rendered one of the elements of the
crime incomplete. He felt it did not. In his view, if the defendant actually performed the acts essential to completion of the offense, encouragement on the part of the victim or his agents did not negate any of these
acts, except, perhaps, if the encouragement amounted to duress. No
Brockman v. State, 192 Wis. 15, 211 N.W. 936 (1927), holding that an
essential element of larceny is that the state must prove the taking and use of
property without the owner's consent, and citing Topolewski as authority.
See also AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 141 (1965) ; Note, supra note 10, at
1335 n.18.
28 160 Wis. 255, 152 N.W. 181 (1915).
29 Id. at 268, 152 N.W. at 185.
30 Id. at 270, 152 N.W. at 186.
27See
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question was presented as to the propriety of convicting one of a
crime induced by a law enforcement officer or his agent, which the
accused was not predisposed to commit.
The third encouragement case to come before the court was the first
true entrapment situation. In Piper v. State,31 the defendant was convicted of practicing medicine without a license. A state inspector for
the board of health came to him claiming venereal disease and seeking
a cure. The defendant sold him a remedy and was arrested. The court
rejected the entrapment defense and -said of Topolewski and Koscak:
These cases are merely to the proposition that where a person,
by himself or agent, in'order to entrap a suspected person, does
any act exculpating the accused from an essential element of the
crime involved, the crime
is not committed by the accused be32
cause of the exculpation.
The court then cited Justice Barnes' dissenting opinion in Koscak and
said that it was the correct statement of the law in the Piper situation.
"The conduct of the defendant, not the motive or deception of the inspector, is considered." 33
The court confused the doctrine of entrapment in this case. Although it was correct in implying that Topolewski and Koscak were not
entrapment cases, it went on to cite Justice Barnes' dissent as the law
on entrapment. Justice Barnes, however, also was clearly concerned
with the factual situation in which a citizen-victim does the encouraging, and this does not constitute the accepted concept of entrapment.
The fundamental misconception in Piper was the court's belief that entrapment questions are determined solely by the defendant's conduct.
As the United States Supreme Court pointed out two years later in
Sorrells, it is with the conduct of the government agent that entrapment is primarily concerned. 34 Thus, one who has committed every act
essential to the crime may be acquited precisely because of the unreasonable conduct of the government agent. The source of the confusion lies in the fact that after the court stated that Piper was not a
Topolewski or Koscak situation-that is, there was encouragement by
a government agent rather than exculpation by an encouraging intended
victim-it proceeded to apply the reasoning and opinions in those cases.
The court again considered the defense in State ex rel. Kowalewski
v. Kubiak,35 but this time with the benefit of the Sorrells decision. The
defendant was charged with accepting a bribe in his capacity as chairman of a board of town supervisors. He challenged the preliminary
examination that resulted in his being bound over for trial, and one of
31202 Wis. 58, 231 N.W. 162 (1930).
32 Id. at 63, 231 N.W. at 165.
33 Id. at 64, 231 N.W. at 165.
31 287 U.S. at 451-52.
3 256 Wis. 518, 41 N.W.2d 605 (1950).
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the grounds alleged was entrapment. The court did not recite the facts
because a trial was scheduled, but held that the magistrate could meet
the "probable cause" burden of a preliminary so as to find no entrapment. The court said the standard of denying the entrapment defense
would be a finding that the intent to commit the crime originated in defendant's mind and that he had done every act essential to completion
of the offense. For this proposition, Piper was cited. Entrapment, said
the court, is not condemned per se, but only when "officers of the law
•.. lure or incite a person to attempt to commit crime." 36

The influence of Sorrells is clear. Although citing Piper, the court
added the emphasis on origin of intent, and specifically stated that the
doctrine of entrapment only applies to conduct of officers of the law.
This exemplifies a shift in the court's reasoning to the real function of
the entrapment defense-a deterrent to unreasonable conduct by law
enforcement officers.
In 1953, the Wisconsin Legislature gave tentative approval to a
statutory definition of the entrapment defense. The proposed criminal
code was allowed to be published in the 1953 Statutes on tinted paper,
subject to re-enactment in 1955.37 Section 339.40 of that code, under the
heading "Defenses to Criminal Liability" was the defense of entrapment:
The fact that the actor was induced or solicited to commit
a crime for the purpose of obtaining evidence with which to
prosecute him is a defense unless:
(1) The idea of committing the crime originated with the
actor or a co-conspiritor and not with the person soliciting
or inducing its commission; or
(2) The crime was of a type which is likely to occur and
recur in the course of the actor's business or activity, and the
person doing the inducing or soliciting did not mislead the
actor into believing his conduct to be lawful and did not use
undue inducement or encouragement to procure the commission of the crime.
In 1955, however, a revised code3" was adopted and the 1953 code was
allowed to die for lack of re-enactment. Section 339.40 was not in the
1955 bill because the committee that formulated the code did not feel
it properly stated the doctrine of entrapment. 39
Upon this foundation, State v. Hochman was decided. As has been
shown, Hochman does state the law in accord with the majority concept of entrapment. However, it purports to be based upon the previously explained precedent. 40 This includes two cases that dealt with
Id. at 521, 41 N.W.2d at 607.
37 Wis. Laws 1953, ch. 623.
38 Wis. Laws 1955, ch. 696.
39 Platz, The Criminal Code, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 350, 367.
40 W~isconsin cases cited in Hochman included Topolewski, Koscak, Pipcr, and
Kowalewski.
36
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a failure to prove essential elements, a true entrapment situation that
was decided on the basis of proving actual completion of the elements,
another true entrapment situation which recognized origin of intent but
emphasized completion of the essential acts, and a statute that admittedly did not state the law. Under the Sorrells-Sherman and Hochman
tests, the completion of all the essential acts is admitted or the affirmative defense is not available. Thus, the major points in the Wisconsin
precedents to Hochmnan are merely conditions precedent to any consideration of the real issue facing a court in entrapment claims: the
reasonableness of the government agent's encouragement. Hochman is
the first Wisconsin case to recognize this, and its ostensible reliance on
prior Wisconsin cases must be disregarded in favor of non-Wisconsin
authorities cited by the court that were really followed. 41
Conclusion
Police encouragement practices are a very real necessity in those
categories of conduct that society has deemed criminal but in which
there is no complaining victim. Traffic in narcotics, sale of obscene
materials, consensual sex offenses, prostitution and gambling are all
such crimes. However, encouragement practices by government agents
can be abused and used to such an extent as to go beyond the limits
of lawful investigation and become unlawful entrapment. Should courts
fail to impose standards of acceptable police conduct, it seems likely
that the increasing challenges to encouragement practices as violative
of due process will ultimately be successful. If the test of a court's
effectiveness in controlling the problem is the general acceptance of its
definition of entrapment, the Wisconsin court can find strength in numbers, for since Hochman in 1957, it has followed the majority view. If
the test is how that definition has been applied to the fact situations
presented, the Wisconsin court's situation is dubious, for of the cases
presented to the appellate court, few have been actual entrapment situations and the defense has never been successful. If the test is consistency and clarity in development and expression of the concept, the
Wisconsin position is in peril, for its foundation is shaky indeed.
TnOMAS W. ST. JOHN*
41 Non-Wisconsin authorities cited in Hochman included Sorrells; United States
v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933); State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1,
89 A.2d 219 (1952); 15 Ami. JUR. Criminal Law § 335 (1938); 22 C.J.S.

Criminal Law § 45(a) (1961).

* Since the completion of this note, the author was inducted into the United
States Army, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court has decisively dealt with the
issue of entrapment in Hawthorne v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 82, 168 N.W.2d 85 (1969).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court saw fit to footnote the State v. Rice case, 37
Wis. 2d 392, 155 N.W.2d 116 (1967), but felt that the facts of that opinion did
not warrant discussion in the Hawthorne decision.
Two additional issues were raised in Hawthorne: (1) the evidentiary burden
on the defendant to prove entrapment, and (2) the propriety of the defense of
entrapment being determined in a pre-trial hearing to the court, that is, in a
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proceeding similar to those used to determine the voluntariness of confessions.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in re-affirming its reliance upon the "origin
of intent" test, declared that the defendant must establish by a preponderance
of the evidence an inducement or solicitation by the police officer. In citing
authority for this proposition, the court attempted to distinguish between the
degrees of inducement as relating to the burden of proof. Although this may
well be a consideration in justifying the entrapment instruction, the court failed
to distinguish adequately between the burden of defensive evidence in light of
the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof on the state under Wisconsin Instructions-Criminal, No. 140.
The argument in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), that a defensive plea of entrapment is inconsistent with a general denial and constitutes
a plea in bar to prosecution, was discussed and rejected on the prior precedent
of State v. Hochinan, 2 Wis. 2d 410, 86 N.W.2d 446 (1957), and because of the
lack of cited authority for the proposition in the defendant's brief. However,
the relegation of entrapment to its customary position in the factual presentation of the trial skirts the underlying conflict of the defendant's right to silence,
as enunciated in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), and the inconsistency of
a trial on the facts, when the court has by its own definition caused the defendant
to admit the superficial commission of the factual elements of the crime in order
to present the subtle issue of intent as defensive matter. The elements of the
corpus of the crime are always a part of the affirmative burden of the state.
The defendant's argument for a pre-trial determination of a plea of entrapment was likewise rejected by the Wisconsin court. But the court does not
discuss the implications of forcing the defendant to take the stand to present
his defense as being contrary to the Fifth Amendment rights to silence, the
extension of the waiver doctrine under the rules of cross-examination to allow
impeachment of the defendant, and the problem of the swearing match between
the officer and the defendant.
The evident effect of Rice v. State and Hawthorne v. State is to place the
defense of entrapment outside any previous characterizations and to force it
into a Topolewski v. State, 130 Wis. 244, 109 N.W. 1037 (1906), format, i.e., that
the defense is only cognizable by the court when the prosecution has failed in
the presentation of the essential elements to constitute the corpus of the crime.
If this is so, then the opinion of the court in Hawthorne v. State is negated, as
the case should not be submitted to the jury, and the argument for a pre-trial
plea characterization as a plea in bar is the rationale for sustaining the defense.
M.W.H.

